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OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES  
TO THE RELATIVITY OF TRUTH  
Dan Zeman1 
In “Obstacles to the Relativity of Truth”, Tomáš Marvan aptly puts to-
gether the most important objections that have been raised to the doc-
trine that has witnessed perhaps the most impressive renaissance in con-
temporary philosophy: relativism. Marvan’s reaction is motivated by an 
increasing number of attempts to breed new life into the doctrine, at-
tempts that have lead to the necessity of reevaluating the old aguments 
directed on their predecessors. 
 Marvan focuses on and targets his observations towards a particular 
relativist view, namely truth-relativism. My aim in this paper is to sketch 
a version of truth-relativism that successfully overcomes the obstacles 
Marvan puts in the relativist’s way. However, the view I am going to 
sketch is not intended to fully address all of Marvan’s worries. In partic-
ular, I have no more than a few words to say about relativism in the fac-
tual domain (or fact-relativism, as it might be called), for I concur with 
his conclusion that the view is highly implausible. This might come ra-
ther as a disappointment, for Marvan stresses that he is most interested 
in such views, precisely because they are “particularly challenging, but 
also particularly afflicted with serious difficulties” (Marvan 2006, 440). 
Nevertheless, I think it is worthy to look at those domains to which con-
temporary truth-relativists apply the theory (domains that are more on 
the “subjective”, or “normative” side than on the factual side – see the 
list below) both because it gives us a useful model of how a relativist 
theory should look like and because it highlights the limitations of the 
doctrine. 
                                                 
1  I want to thank Marián Zouhar and Tomáš Marvan for helpful suggestions that in-
creased the accuracy and coherence of the paper. Also, I need to acknowledge the fi-
nancial help from the Slovak Academic Information Agency which awarded me  
a scholarship within The National Scholarship Programme of the Slovak Republic for 
the Support of Mobility of Students, PhD Students, University Teachers and Research-
ers for the academic year 2006 – 2007. 
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Formal aspects of the view 
Recently, truth-relativism has taken the form of a semantic account to be 
given to some specific areas of discourse. Among discourses amenable to 
relativistic treatment are those about future contingents, knowledge at-
tributions, epistemic modals, gradeable adjectives, and discourses that 
exhibit the phenomenon known as “faultless disagreement” (basically, 
the evaluative domain). Other applications, not worked out yet, are seen 
as having good prospects to fit the truth-relativistic model. 
 The formal part of the theory is a slight modification of the traditional, 
Kaplanian framework. As it is widely known, in his work on indexicals 
Kaplan has put forward a model according to which in order to establish 
an utterance’s truth-value we need to follow two steps: first, to deter-
mine the content of the utterance in a given context; second, to evaluate 
that content with respect to the salient parameters. In the first step, the 
important notion is that of “context of utterance”, whereas for the se-
cond the crucial notion is that of “circumstance of evaluation”. This lat-
ter notion is what interests us here. A circumstance is defined as that 
with respect to which contents should be evaluated, and it “will usually 
include a possible state or history of the world, a time, and perhaps other 
features as well“ (Kaplan 1989, 502).2 For those utterances that don’t con-
tain indexical expressions, containing instead only expressions whose 
semantic value does not change with context (expressions with fixed 
character, as Kaplan called them), the first step is superfluous, so it need 
not be performed. Nevertheless, in order to establish the truth-value of 
utterances containing such expressions, we do need to perform the se-
cond step: their truth-value is to be established by evaluating them with 
respect to suitable circumstances of evaluation. 
 The modification the relativist has to perform consists simply in in-
troducing more parameters than the usual ones in the circumstances of 
                                                 
2  Lewis (1980), whose view differs in a number of ways from that of Kaplan, but for 
what we are interested now is quite similar to it, thinks of circumstances of evaluation 
(which he calls “indices”) as incorporating more parameters – an agent and a place 
(and possibly a standard of precission) in addition to a world and a time. I don’t want 
to commit to any view about what are the right parameters that must enter in the cir-
cumstances of evaluation. I will speak of “the usual parameters” to denote whatever 
parameters are included in the circumstances of evaluation – with the exception, of 
course, of those the relativist will introduce in order to account for the discourses to 
which she applies the theory (see below). 
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evaluation against which utterances have to be evaluated. The parame-
ters that need to be introduced vary, of course, with the discourse to 
which the view is supposed to apply. Thus, a relativist about taste, for 
example, will claim that an utterance of the sentence “Avocado is tasty” 
needs to be evaluated against a standard of taste parameter (along with 
the usual parameters); a relativist about knowledge attributions will 
claim that an utterance of the sentence “Moore knows that he has hands” 
needs to be evaluated against a standard of knowledge parameter (again, 
along with the usual parameters). This is how it works for the other do-
mains as well.  
 Now, to this modification the relativist has only to add the observa-
tion that the same utterance (or different, but with the same semantical 
value) might be true when evaluated with respect to a circumstance, but 
false when evaluated with respect to another circumstance. To give an 
example, an utterance like “Raising animals for food is wrong” is true 
when evaluated with respect to a circumstance containing as a parame-
ter a moral standard according to which raising animals for food is 
wrong, but false when evaluated with respect to a circumstance contain-
ing as a parameter a moral standard that allows raising animals in order 
to fill our menus. Relativism could be then defined as the view that the 
same proposition (since it is propositions that are the semantic values of 
utterances) could be both true and false when evaluated with respect to 
different circumstances of evaluation. The formal apparatus briefly pre-
sented above allows the relativist to express his view in a way that does 
not require a radical departure from the traditional semantic framework. 
Stating the view 
Given the multiplicity of views that breathe under the label “relativism”, 
authors discussing relativism in general felt the need to provide a unify-
ing schema that captures what the view is essentially about. That schema 
then becomes the mark of any “true” version of relativism.3 Marvan’s 
favorite choice for the schema that unites all trully relativist positions is 
the following: 
                                                 
3  Variants of such a unifying schema are offered in Haack (1996), Swoyer (2003), Kölbel 
(2004) – to cite just a few authors. 
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 (R)  Relative to S, claim C is true; relative to S′, C is not true. 
 A quick look on the framework presented in the preceeding section 
makes it clear that the position I advocate conforms to the schema (R). 
The only duty we have is to state clearly, as Marvan demands, what S is. 
Following several authors, Marvan chooses for S the term “perspective”. 
I have nothing in principle against using this term, but I think it still is in 
need of a clearcut definition. I will use instead the Kaplanian term “cir-
cumstance of evaluation”. As we have seen, a circumstance of evaluation 
is a set of parameters against which utterances from a given domain 
must be evaluated, the set varying with the domain in question. So we 
have a pretty clear grasp on what circumstances of evaluation are. I will 
refer to the other parameters from the circumstances of evaluation be-
sides the usual ones with the term “standard”, which comprises both the 
evaluative and the normative realm (moral standards, aesthetic stand-
ards or knowledge standards will all be standards of this sort). 
 Marvan’s main purpose in his paper is to show that the schema (R) 
has no interpretation that would yield a coherent and intelligible posi-
tion. In contrast, I will argue that the formal theory presented above 
provides just such an interpretation. 
The objections 
First obstacle: relative truths 
Kaplan has defined truth-in-context as follows: 
If c is a context, then an occurrence of φ in c is true iff the content expressed 
by φ in this context is true when evaluated with respect to the circumstance 
of the context (Kaplan 1989, 522). 
 For Kaplan, φ is a sentence containing indexical expressions. Now, 
the relativist might use the same definition of truth, taking φ to be a sen-
tence comprising a term belonging to the target discourse (and maybe 
indexical expressions as well). Here is an example of how the truth of an 
utterance about the painting Mona Lisa should be defined: 
 (RT) If c is a context, then an occurence of the sentence “Mona Lisa is 
beautiful” is true(s) iff the content expressed by “Mona Lisa is 
beautiful” is true in this context according to aestethic standards. 
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 Given this way of stating the truth of utterances, the relativist will say 
that all truths are relative – in the sense that they are relative to the cir-
cumstances of evaluation with respect to which utterances of those 
truths are evaluated. (In the example above I left out all the usual pa-
rameters, considering only the aesthetic standard. This is appropriate, 
since we are interested in the relativity of utterances from the aesthetic 
domain within one and the same world.) Yet, this claim is hardly sur-
prising, for it rests on some fairly well entrenched views about how we 
evaluate certain types of utterances. It is a common-place in possible 
worlds semantics, for example, that contingent claims are true in some 
worlds, but not in others. In the jargon of the framework discussed, this 
amounts to saying that a given claim is true with respect to one world and 
false with respect to another. And although there is an ongoing debate 
regarding the semantics of temporal expressions, one of the consequenc-
es of temporalism is that time must be part of the circumstances of eval-
uation against which we evaluate utterances of tensed sentences. 
(Kaplan himself, as a temporalist, offers some arguments for this view.) 
So the idea that a given utterance is true with respect to circumstances 
comprising the usual parameters is quite common. What is uncommon is 
the relativist’s claim that in order to account for the truth of utterances 
belonging to the target domain, we have to introduce additional parame-
ters into the circumstances of evaluation. Besides this additional claim, 
the view is as close as possible to the ortodoxy in current semantics. 
 This is quite remote from the discussions about claims being abso-
lutely or relatively true that Marvan surveys in his paper. But this might 
turn out to be a positive feature of the present view: the need to provide 
a principled way of distinguishing absolute truths from relative ones  
– a quite hard task for early relativists – does not even arise in this 
framework. All truths are relative, but in the innocuous and unexciting 
sense specified.  
Second obstacle: sameness of content 
Marvan’s second complaint is that relativists fall short of preserving the 
identity of a proposition through perspectives. This complaint is made in 
two kinds of cases: with respect to factual claims, like “Winston Church-
ill was born in Prague”, and with respect to Gilbert Harman’s moral rela-
tivism. In the first case, Marvan finds no way to make sense of the rela-
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tivist’s claim, whereas in the second he finds Harman’s brand of relativ-
ism not worthy of its name.  
 I agree with Marvan’s conclusion that Harman’s view is not trully 
relativistic. Although things are not totally clear here, Harman’s main 
claim seems to be that terms like “ought” mean different things when ut-
tered by people having different moral outlooks.4 The claim is that “[f]or 
the purposes of assigning objective truth-conditions, a judgment of the 
form, it would be morally wrong of P to D, has to be understood as ellip-
tical for a judgment of the form, in relation to moral framework M, it 
would be morally wrong of P to D” (Harman 1996, 43, my emphasis). 
Since moral frameworks vary, what the judgment is elliptical for has dif-
ferent contents in different contexts.5 This is, in my view, a clear form of 
contextualism. Compare the view with contextualism in epistemology: 
according to people like David Lewis or Keith DeRose, the word “know” 
has different meaning depending on the context of its use: uttered in  
a philosophy class, where the knowledge standards are high, the sen-
tence “Moore knows that he has hands” means one thing, whereas ut-
tered in ordinary contexts (say, at the marketplace), where the 
knowledge standards are low, means something else. None of these 
claims is one that the relativist is committed to. Therefore, the failure of 
Harman’s view does not have any bearing upon the relativist position 
per se. 
 There is an important issue in that connection, which Marvan brings 
out in a footnote. He claims that the “proposal in question [i.e., Har-
man’s view] goes against the grain of one of the classical principles of 
semantics, viz. that a difference in truth-value of two claims implies  
a corresponding difference in the propositions expressed” (Marvan 2006, 
5, fn. 17). However, this principle, as more than a couple of authors have 
suggested,6 is clearly false. For a difference in truth value of two claims 
(utterances) does not necessarily lead to a difference in their content. It 
might be the case, as the relativist is eager to point out, that the two ut-
terances are evaluated with respect to different circumstances of evalua-
                                                 
4  In James Dreier’s (1990) version of the view, called “speaker relativism”, the same 
holds for terms like “good” or “bad”, which behave like indexicals. 
5  Although he is careful to mention that the claim is not to be understood as implying 
that speakers intend to speak about or to refer to moral frameworks when making 
judgments of the form “it would be morally wrong of P to D”. 
6  Cappelen and Lepore (2005), Predelli (2005), MacFarlane (forthcoming). 
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tion – in which case their content remains the same. It is the circum-
stances that are responsible for the difference in truth-value, and not the 
different content, which remains constant across evaluations. 
 However, the problem posed by Marvan is indeed one that is crucial 
for the relativist. For the problem with the contents the relativist evalu-
ates with respect to circumstances of evaluation is that they might turn 
out not to be the kind of contents that are fully truth-evaluable. As it is 
known from the temporalism-eternalism debate, Frege opposed tem-
poralism by claiming that tensed utterances must be first “completed” – 
that is, the time of the utterance must be part of the content they express 
in a given context. A similar objection might be raised in connection with 
other forms of relativism, to the effect that the contents the relativist 
claims to be relative to circumstances are not complete – they don’t ex-
press truth-evaluable contents. Another related worry is that the relativ-
ist’s contents, being incomplete, cannot be the appropriate objects for 
propositional attitudes. The relativist might thus be forced to postulate 
kinds of contents that do not overlap with what we usually think them 
to be: propositions. But this does not mean that the relativist is out of re-
sources here: she might retort to “propositional functions” (Perry 1993), 
“relativized propositions” (Recanati, forthcoming a), “lektons” (Recanati, 
forthcoming b), and other sorts of relativizable contents. Although I can-
not dwell on these matters here, I fully acknowledge the relativist’s duty 
to provide a theory of content that answers all the problems listed above. 
 Now, with respect to factual matters, Marvan says that a view hold-
ing that  
[r]elative to a perspective S, the claim “Winston Churchill was born in Pra-
gue” is true; relative to (our) perspective S′, the same claim is false 
is unintelligible, for there is no way in which we could make sense of 
this relativistic claim. On this score, I totally agree with Marvan. Accord-
ing to the theory presented, the only way to represent the claim’s relativ-
ity is to interpret S as circumstances of evaluation comprising only worlds. 
The result will be that “Winston Churchill was born in Prague” might be 
true at some worlds, but false at others (including ours). However, we 
are interested in what is the case in one world, the actual one. That means, 
as Marvan also stresses, that we have to capture the relativity by keeping 
the world “constant across different perspectives” (Marvan 2006, 446). 
We need, then, to introduce some other parameter in the circumstances 
of evaluation that will account for the relativity of the claim: something 
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like Kuhnian paradigms, or other kinds of “entities” along the same lines. 
However, the problem with those is that they are not likely to be the 
kind of “entities” that might enter in the circumstances of evaluation as 
parameters. For paradigms, as they are usually understood, have a bear-
ing upon the truth-values of claims pertaining to them because these on-
ly apparently use the same concepts: what a word means in one para-
digm is different from what it does in another. So the claim that “Win-
ston Churchill was born in Prague” is not likely to have the same content 
across paradigms.7 
Third obstacle: too many truths 
Marvan’s third and last objection to truth-relativism is that it leads to  
a proliferation of notions of truth. On this basis he criticizes Jack Mei-
land’s (1977) claim that the ordinary view of truth, as a two-term relation 
between a content and the world, must be abandoned and replaced by 
another conception of truth as a three-term relation between  
a content, the world and “perspective”. 
 Whether or not Meiland’s view of truth as a two-term relation be-
tween a content and the world indeed captures our ordinary way of 
thinking about truth, he is right in holding that truth must be conceived 
as a ternary relation. However, in our framework it is not “perspectives” 
that must be the third term in the three-term relation, but – as expected – 
circumstances of evaluation. Truth will be then a three-term relation be-
tween a content, a subject and a circumstance of evaluation. (The world, 
constituting one of the terms in Meiland’s three-term relation is now in-
cluded into the circumstance as a parameter.) This comes out clearly in 
(RT) above, where the truth predicate is true(s) – truth at a circumstance 
of evaluation comprising the salient aesthetic standard (the usual pa-
rameters were left out for expository convenience). However, this is not 
such a revolutionary move as Meiland thought. For, as we have seen, the 
ternary view of truth is already established within traditional semantics. 
The relativist just adds the twist that the circumstances comprising the 
usual parameters must be supplemented by other, suitable parameters. 
 The issue that remains is the connection between the relativistic no-
tion of truth and the ordinary one. Here the relativist must bite the bullet 
                                                 
7  I am not saying that a proposal along these lines is impossible to be forged; I’m just ex-
pressing skepticism with regard to its prospects.  
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and admit that the connection is not that tight. But he could also point 
out in her favor that even if the concept of truth as relativized to circum-
stances departs from our common-sense notion, it does not depart more 
radically than any notion of truth used in semantics does. Indeed, the 
concept of truth employed by semanticists must have at least some min-
imal connection with the ordinary notion. But it would be unreasonable 
to expect a full overlap here.8 After all, they serve different purposes: one 
concept serves to ascribe truth in ordinary situations; the other is de-
signed to be part of a full-fledged semantic theory. So, while conscious of 
the fact that the theory should yield results as close to those we usually 
get in our day-by-day practice of evaluating utterances of all sorts, we 
should nevertheless expect cases in which there is a divergence in results. 
One such divergence seems to appear in the case of relativism itself: 
even if, based on our intuitions, we see normal conversations as involv-
ing (or not involving) disagreement between the participants, the seman-
tic apparatus employed by the relativist might yield results that contra-
dict the intuitions we have.9 
Finale 
Marvan ends his paper with a handful of advices for the relativist. It is 
always good to listen to good advice, but as far as the version of relativ-
ism put forward in this paper is concerned, the relativist need not worry. 
With the proviso mentioned in connection to fact-relativism, she could 
reassuringly check the remaining items on Marvan’s list of tasks and 
then look forward with the confidence of someone who had just passed 
an important test. 
                                                 
8  For an illuminating discussion about, on one hand, the relationship between the inputs 
to the semantic apparatus (“the system”) and what we usually think them to be, and, 
on the other hand, the outputs of the system and what we usually think them to be, see 
Predelli (2005). 
9  For a more detailed discussion about how relativism accounts for the intuitions we 
have in various cases of ordinary conversations about taste and moral matters, and  
a comparison between relativism and “indexicalism” on that score, see my (forthcom-
ing). 
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